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In the Spring 2008 issue of the Tennessee Law Review, I
wrote an essay questioning whether Tennessee's method for select-
ing appellate judges, the "Tennessee Plan," satisfies the require-
ments of the Tennessee Constitution.' The Tennessee Constitution
requires all judges to be "elected by the qualified voters" of the
state,' yet, under the Plan, all appellate judges are initially selected
by gubernatorial appointment and then retained in uncontested ref-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. J.D.,
2000, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Katie Waite for her helpful re-
search assistance.
1. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Election as Appointment: The Tennessee
Plan Reconsidered, 75 TENN. L. REV. 473 (2008).
2. TENN. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3,4.
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erenda.3 Although the Tennessee Supreme Court has twice re-
jected challenges to the Plan, I argued that the court has not yet
considered three very serious questions about the Plan's constitu-
tionality.4 In my view, these questions are not easily answered,
and they suggest that the Tennessee Plan is unconstitutional. For
this reason, I recommended that the legislature refuse to reauthor-
ize the Plan when it expires in June of 2009.'
Two very distinguished authors, Penny White, a former
Tennessee Supreme Court Justice, and Malia Reddick, a researcher
at the American Judicature Society, have published a colorful re-
sponse to my essay.7 I have the greatest respect for both Justice
White and Ms. Reddick, and I very much appreciate the time they
took to read my essay and to comment on it. Unfortunately, how-
ever, I found much of their response more colorful than careful.
Justice White's portion of the response, which argued that the
Tennessee Plan is constitutional, in particular suffered from factual
errors, misunderstandings of my essay, and methodological uncer-
tainty.8 Although Ms. Reddick's portion of the response did not
suffer from the same flaws, her arguments in favor of the Tennes-
see Plan did not purport to relate to the constitutional questions I
raised in my essay but, rather, to points of public policy.9 Nonethe-
less, as the legislature will no doubt consider points of public pol-
icy as well as constitutional law when it decides whether to reau-
thorize the Plan in 2009, I think it is important to note that Ms.
Reddick's analysis may have overstated the case for so-called
"merit selection" systems, of which the Tennessee Plan is one.
Most particularly, very few of the studies on which Ms. Reddick
based her analysis attempted to assess whether the differences they
observed between elected and merit-selected judges were statisti-
3. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 17-4-101, -102, -114 to -116 (1994 &
Supp. 2007).
4. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 490-99.
5. See id. at 500.
6. "[T]he American Judicature Society ha[s] run national campaigns to
promote the merit [selection] plan." F. Andrew Hanssen, On the Politics of
Judicial Selection: Lawyers and State Campaigns for the Merit Plan, 110
PUBLIC CHOICE 79 (2002).
7. See Penny J. White & Malia Reddick, A Response to Professor Fitz-
patrick: The Rest of the Story, 75 TENN. L. REv. 501 (2008).
8. See infra Parts I and II.
9. See infra Part Ill.
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cally significant (let alone attempted to control for all of the other
relevant variables that may have caused those differences).
In Part I of this reply, I show that much of Justice White's
response was based on factual assertions that are false. In Part II, I
show that Justice White's constitutional arguments suffer from
both misunderstandings of my essay and methodological uncer-
tainty. In Part III, I respond to the policy points raised by Ms.
Reddick and argue that she overstates the evidence in favor of so-
called "merit selection" systems like the Tennessee Plan. Finally,
in Part IV, I offer a few conclusions about the future of judicial
selection in Tennessee.
I. SOME FACTS ABOUT THE TENNESSEE PLAN
Justice White began her response by stating that my essay
"misinform[ed]" and "misle[d]" readers on "the mechanics" of the
Tennessee Plan. Justice White said my essay did this because it
described the Plan as "controvers[ial]" and asserted (she said
"without attribution") that "'many people doubt' whether it has
accomplished its [intended] purposes."' I do not believe my char-
acterizations of the Tennessee Plan are misinformed or misleading.
Rather, as I explain below, I believe that Justice White's assertions
otherwise are based on factual claims that are untrue."
10. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 501 n.2.
11. Justice White also claimed that I "misle[d]" readers by "suggesting
that the Tennessee General Assembly's decision to move to a merit selection
system for appellate judges was a response to changes in other states." White &
Reddick, supra note 7, at 501 n.2. In doing so, she said I "ignore[d] the myriad
of circumstances that led to the 1971 legislation." Id. It is difficult to know
what to make of these colorful claims. All I said was that "the Tennessee legis-
lature followed the lead of a number of other states and replaced the direct elec-
tion of appellate judges with a selection method called 'merit selection."' Fitz-
patrick, supra note 1, at 473. As Ms. Reddick herself pointed out later in the
response, it is a fact that Tennessee was not the first state to adopt merit selec-
tion but did so only after a number of other states. See White & Reddick, supra
note 7, at 536 (noting that "Missouri ... first established what it termed the
'Nonpartisan Court Plan' in 1940" and "[d]uring the 1960s and 1970s, twenty-
three jurisdictions [including Tennessee] adopted what had become known as
the 'Missouri Plan' or 'merit selection"'). Indeed, Justice White herself ac-
knowledged as much when she noted that the Governor who signed the Tennes-
see Plan into law called it the "modified Missouri Plan." Id. at 512. I have no
idea why Justice White thinks I have "misle[d]" anyone or "cherry pick[ed]"
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To begin with, I did, in fact, make an attribution for my as-
sertion that many people question the effectiveness of the Tennes-
see Plan. In footnote six of my original essay, I noted that the gov-
ernor of Tennessee recently sued the -commission of lawyers that
nominates judges under the Plan because the commission was not
furthering one of the intended purposes of the Plan: to bring more
racial diversity to the bench. 2 In addition, in the same footnote, I
cited nine different scholars who have questioned whether merit
selection plans like Tennessee's have served their other intended
purposes. 3 (These are the scholars that Justice White's co-author,
Ms. Reddick, spent eight pages rebutting in her portion of the re-
sponse.) Although these scholars wrote about merit selection plans
in general, and not Tennessee's in particular, I would have thought
it impossible to have lived in Tennessee in recent years and not be
aware that the Tennessee Plan is controversial and that many peo-
ple doubt it is serving its purposes. Perhaps most obviously, the
legislature decided in May of 2008, after a high-profile debate, not
to reauthorize the Tennessee Plan.14 Instead, the legislature sent
the Plan into a one-year wind down period, at the end of which the
Plan will terminate unless the legislature acts to save it. 5 And this
is just the tip of the iceberg. There have been dozens upon dozens
of newspaper articles, radio shows, and public debates regarding
the various merits and demerits of the Tennessee Plan in recent
years. Many of these articles and other materials have been col-
lected on a website, http://www.tennplandebate.com. Readers who
go to this website will find a number of commentators who believe
the Tennessee Plan is not working; 6 they will learn that newspa-
anything, id. at 501 & n.2, by stating the uncontested fact that a number of states
switched from election to merit selection before Tennessee did.
12. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 473-74 n.6.
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., John Rodgers, Wilder's Last Gasp on State Judges Falls
Short, THE NASHVILLE CITY PAPER, May 21, 2008, http://www.nashvillecity
paper.com/news.php?viewStory=60360.
15. See id.
16. See, e.g., Ron Ramsey, Judicial Selection Reform Long Overdue,
TriCities.com, June 1, 2008, http:llwww.tricities.comltrilnews/opinionl
columnists/article/judicial-selectionreformlong.overdue/10205/ (asserting
that the Plan "obviously does not work"); Joseph Woodruff, There is a Better
Way to Pick Top Judges for Tennessee Bench, TENNESSEAN.com, June 24, 2007,
available at http://www.tennplandebate.com/archive.aspx?cat=5 (follow "PDF"
Vol. 39
HeinOnline  -- 39 U. Mem. L. Rev. 88 2008-2009
2008 Errors, Omissions, and the Tennessee Plan 89
pers in the state came out against reauthorizing the Plan in 2008 by
a margin of 3-1;' 7 and they will even find two editorials written by
the second most-widely-circulated newspaper in America, the Wall
Street Journal, urging the Tennessee legislature not to reauthorize
the Plan.' Readers can decide for themselves whether any of this
makes the Plan controversial.
I should add that the controversy over the Tennessee Plan
has not been restricted to the recent past; the controversy dates to
the Plan's earliest history. Although Justice White asserted other-
wise in her response, her claims are false. For example, she
claimed that none of the Tennessee Plan's "statutory prescriptions
alarmed scholars of Tennessee constitutional history,"' 9 but one of
the scholars she cited for her claim is Professor Lewis Laska.20 Not
only has Professor Laska never said that the Tennessee Plan has
not alarmed scholars, 2' but he personally has been quite alarmed by
hyperlink under "There is a Better Way to Pick Top Judges for Tennessee
Bench") ("Tennessee's process for filing judicial vacancies needs a serious
overhaul.").
17. Compare Editorial, Best Way to Pick State Judges, CHATrANOOGA
TIMES FREE PRESS, Feb. 29, 2008, available at http://www.tennplandebate.com/
archive.aspx?cat=5 (follow "PDF" hyperlink under "Best Way to Pick State
Judges") ("We suggest it would be a good idea to let the current system
expire ...."), and Editorial, Ramsey Idea May be what We Need, CITY PAPER,
April 11, 2008, http://www.nashvillecitypaper.conlnews.php?viewStory=59524
(opining that it would be "doing the people of Tennessee a favor to allow this
commission to sunset"), and Editorial, Reform Tennessee's System for Judicial
Picks, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, May 5, 2008, http://www.commercialappeal.com/
news/2008/may/05/editorials-reform-system-for-judicial-picks/ (opining that
"the commission currently wields influence.., out of proportion to its account-
ability to citizens" and "[t]hat needs to change"), with Editorial, Renew Judicial
Selection Panel but Open the Process, KNOX NEWS, May 9, 2008,
http://www.knoxnews.comlnews/2008/May/09/renew-judicial-selection-panel-
but-open-the/.
18. See Editorial, Tennessee's Trial Run, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2008, at
A10; Editorial, Three Gavels for Tennessee, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2008, avail-
able at http://online.wsj.com/public/article-print/SB 121184515872021259.html.
19. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 510.
20. See id. at 510 nn.75-76.
21. Professor Laska's piece simply stated in treatise-like fashion that the
Tennessee Plan was the current method of selecting judges; it did not give his
opinion of the constitutionality of the Plan, let alone suggest that no scholar has
ever been alarmed by the constitutionality of the Plan. See Lewis L. Laska, The
Tennessee Constitution, in TENNESSEE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS:
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the Plan. He personally filed one of the suits challenging the Plan
2that was ultimately resolved by the Tennessee Supreme Court,
and he attempted to intervene personally in another such suit.23 In
these cases, Professor Laska made quite clear that he thought the
Tennessee Plan was unconstitutional. For example, he said that the
first Tennessee Supreme Court decision upholding the Plan, State
ex rel. Higgins v. Dunn,24 was "flatly wrong" because the notion
that "a retention election is a true 'election' ignored the Tennessee
Constitution's strong preference for popular election of the judici-
ary by majority vote."25 Thus, it is simply not true that Professor
Laska thinks, as Justice White said he does, that "the details of
judicial selection in Tennessee were left to the legislature's pre-
rogative."26 Rather, he believes that "[r]etention election of judges
DEMOCRACY IN THE VOLUNTEER STATE 7, 20-21 (John R. Vile & Mark Byrnes
eds., 1998) ("Supreme Court judges serve an eight-year term. The method of
electing the judges is left to the General Assembly. Currently, an appellate court
nominating commission presents the governor with the names of three qualified
persons. After appointment, judges must stand for election during which the
voters vote yes or no on retaining the judge, a method called the Missouri Plan
(now the Tennessee Plan)."). The same is true of the other scholar cited by Jus-
tice White, Professor Thomas Van Dervort. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at
510 n.77; see Thomas R. Van Dervort, The Changing Court System, in
TENNESSEE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS: DEMOCRACY IN THE VOLUNTEER
STATE, supra, at 55, 57 ("The Constitution provides for the election of judges
for eight-year terms. However, candidates screened for qualifications and en-
dorsed by the governor may be placed on the ballot for voter approval or rejec-
tion, and this method (the Missouri Plan) may be developed by the legislature in
such a manner as to constitute election within the meaning of the Constitution.
The Constitution also specifies certain minimal age and residency require-
ments.").
22. See State ex rel. Hooker v. Thompson, 249 S.W.3d 331 (Tenn. 1996).
This case was a consolidation of two lawsuits against the Tennessee Plan, one of
which was filed by Professor Laska. See id.
23. See Brief of Lewis L. Laska in Support of Motion to Intervene, De-
Laney v. Thompson, 982 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1998) (No. 01SO-9806-CH-
00116).
24. 496 S.W.2d 480 (Tenn. 1973).
25. Brief of Lewis L. Laska, supra note 23, at 18, 20.
26. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 510 (citing Laska, supra note 21,
at 20).
Vol. 39
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• . . is not valid under the Tennessee Constitution, and therefore
cannot be instituted by mere legislative act.,
27
It is not only constitutional scholars who have been
alarmed by the Tennessee Plan over the course of its history. Jus-
tice White said that the Tennessee Plan was enacted "with little or
no opposition, 2 ' but the vote in the Senate to enact the Plan in
1971 was 21-10,29 meaning nearly one-third of the members there
opposed it.' ° Justice White also said that, when the Plan was par-
tially repealed in 1974, "no member of the legislature ever sug-
gested that the Tennessee Plan was unconstitutional,"'" but this,
too, is false. Members of the legislature expressed concerns about
the constitutionality of the Plan both when it was first enacted in
1971 and when it was partially repealed in 1974. For example,
when the Plan was debated on the floor of the Tennessee Senate in
1971, one senator had this to say:
Do you consider this to be an election of judges as
set out in Article VI, §§ 3 and 4 of the Constitution?
In my opinion this is not an election. An election
entails two people running against one another for a
position that will be elected. I feel that the constitu-
tional question is serious with a one-man bid on the
ballot, and you don't know whether he should stay,
and no one is running against him.32
27. Supplemental Brief of Lewis L. Laska in Reply to Defendant's Oppo-
sition to Intervention and in Reply to Amicus Curiae Brief of American Judica-
ture Society at 12, DeLaney v. Thompson, 982 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1998) (No.
01 SO 1-9806-CH-00 116).
28. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 510.
29. See 1971 Tenn. S. J. 739.
30. The vote in the House was more comfortable, 67-13. See 1971 Tenn.
H. J. 1047.
31. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 512.
32. Audio tape: S. Deb., S. 55, 87th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. Apr.
29, 1971) (tape S-104 on file with Tennessee State Library and Archives) (re-
marks of Sen. Oehmig).
2008
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33This senator was not alone in expressing these concerns,
and the very same concerns were expressed during the debate over
the partial repeal. The sponsor of the partial repeal effort said that
that the amendment was needed, among other reasons, because
"the Constitution does specifically state ... that justices of the su-
preme court will be elected by the people."3 Other senators noted
that "[i]t has been alluded to here that, if we don't repeal the modi-
fied Missouri Plan, the Constitution is being violated because the
people are not electing. 35 Indeed, some members of the senate
noted that the repeal plan was inspired by Justice Humphreys's
dissent in Dunn, in which he opined that the retention feature of
the Plan was "obvious[ly]" unconstitutional. The governor dur-
ing this time, Winfield Dunn, also remembers constitutional con-
troversy. As he notes in his recent memoir, "[T]here were some
who, with justification, questioned the constitutionality of the
[Tennessee Plan]."" Not much has changed since then: almost
forty years later, members of the legislature still think the Plan is
unconstitutional .38
33. See, e.g., id. (remarks of Sen. Roberson) (noting that the Tennessee
Plan "may conflict with the Tennessee Constitution"); id. (remarks of Sen. Al-
bright) (warning that the Tennessee Plan was "on very dangerous ground" be-
cause it "could be at conflict" with the Constitution and because elections are
"the very basics of what we believe in this country").
34. See, e.g., Audio tape: S. Deb., S. 339, 88th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Tenn. Apr. 17, 1973) (tape S-101 on file with Tenn. State Library and Ar-
chives) (remarks of Sen. Blank) (making this argument despite noting that "the
recent opinion in the [Dunn] case [said] that it was constitutional").
35. See id. (remarks of Sen. Ayres) (disagreeing with that view).
36. State ex rel Dunn v. Higgins, 496 S.W.2d 480, 493 (Tenn. 1973)
(Humphreys, J., dissenting); see, e.g., S. Deb., supra note 34 (remarks of Sen.
Ayres) ("One Justice dissented in that opinion and this is the reason for this
whole plan today."); id. (remarks of Sen. Porter) (noting that "[tihe gentleman
that wrote the dissenting opinion for the Supreme Court had a very persuasive
opinion, it appealed to me, it appealed to many," but acknowledging that "he
was one against four").
37. WINFIELD DuNN, FROM A STANDING START 420 (2007).
38. See, e.g., Ryan Harris, Judicial Selection Process Under Fire,
CHAITANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, Jan. 8, 2008, available at
http://www.timesfreepress.comlnewsl2008/jan/O8/Judicial-selection-process-
under-fire/?politicsregional (reporting that "local lawmakers [have] sa[id] the
process is unconstitutional").
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As I noted in my essay, all of this controversy has mired
the Tennessee Plan in litigation for much of the last forty years.
One might have thought that this alone would be sufficient to show
that the Plan has been "controversial," but, here again, Justice
White suggested that I mischaracterized things. In a footnote, she
implied that the Plan has not been "mired in litigation" because she
said it has been the subject of only four lawsuits. 9 One might have
thought that four lawsuits, three of which went all the way to the
Tennessee Supreme Court,4° would be sufficient to constitute a
mire of litigation, but, in fact, there have been many more lawsuits
involving the Plan. For example, as I noted above, just last year,
the governor sued the commission of lawyers that nominates
judges under the Plan,4' noting that they were "playing politics 42
and "trying to force people down [his] throat., 43  Although this
lawsuit, too, was ultimately decided by the Tennessee Supreme
Court, Justice White failed to mention it in her response. Nor did
Justice White mention any of the other lawsuits involving the Plan,
including one that she filed herself.44
Finally, even where Justice White acknowledged the law-
suits that have been filed against the Plan, she left what I think is
an erroneous impression that no one has ever taken these lawsuits
seriously. She said, for example, that in the first case that went to
39. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 521 n.143 ("These two constitu-
tional challenges and two others . . . constitute the 'several cases' that have
caused the Tennessee Plan to be 'mired in litigation."').
40. See DeLaney v. Thompson, 982 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1998); State ex
rel. Hooker v. Thompson, 249 S.W.3d 331 (Tenn. 1996); State ex. rel. Higgins
v. Dunn, 496 S.W.2d 480 (Tenn. 1973).
41. See Bredesen v. Tenn. Judicial Selection Comm'n, 214 S.W.3d 419
(Tenn. 2007).
42. Erik Schelzig, Bredesen Hopes for Smoother Judicial Selection Proc-
ess, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 29, 2007.
43. Ken Whitehouse, Bredesen Lashes Out at Supreme Court Selectors,
NASHVILLE POST, Sept. 6, 2006, available at http://www.nashvillepost.com/
news/2006/9/6/bredesenaccusessupreme-court selectors-of-game-playing.
44. See, e.g., Lillard v. Burson, 933 F.Supp. 698, 700, 702-03 (W.D.
Tenn. 1996) (noting that "Penny J. White" intervened in the suit to enjoin the
State of Tennessee from placing her name on the ballot in a contested election
because it would violate the Due Process Clause to take away her "property
right" under the Tennessee Plan to "run unopposed on a 'yes or no' retention
ballot"); Holder v. Tenn. Judicial Selection Comm'n, 937 S.W.2d 877 (Tenn.
1996).
2008
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the Tennessee Supreme Court, Dunn, the court "upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Tennessee Plan without a struggle ... ,,' Read-
ers, of course, can review Dunn for themselves and decide whether
this characterization is a fair one, but to my mind it is not. The
court was not even unanimous on the question most relevant to our
exchange: whether retention referenda constitute constitutional
"elections"; one of the five members of the court, Justice Hum-
phreys, dissented and argued that the retention feature of the Plan
was "obvious[ly]" unconstitutional.46 Nowhere in her response did
Justice White ever mention the fact that there was a dissent in
Dunn. Moreover, it is not quite true, as Justice White asserted, that
"no challenge to the constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan has
ever been successful. '47 The court in Dunn unanimously struck
down as unconstitutional one portion of the Plan-the nominating
commission-because it violated a separation of powers provision
41in the Tennessee Constitution. In addition, as I noted in my
original essay, a trial judge struck down the entirety of the Plan in
1998. 4' Although this decision was reversed by the Tennessee
Court of Appeals 0 (which was reversed, on other grounds, by the
Tennessee Supreme Courte1), my point here is that there are plenty
of people out there-whether constitutional scholars, legislators, or
even judges-who have doubts that the Tennessee Plan is constitu-
tional.
45. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 514.
46. State ex. rel. Higgins v. Dunn, 496 S.W.2d 480, 493 (Tenn. 1973)
(Humphreys, J., dissenting).
47. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 524.
48. Dunn, 496 S.W.2d at 490.
49. See DeLaney v. Thompson, No. O1AO1-9806-CH-00304, 1998 WL
397363, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 16, 1998) (noting that the Chancery Court
found the Tennessee Plan unconstitutional because "it drastically limits the
group of persons who can become appellate judges" and "virtually insures the
name of the incumbent on the ballot").
50. See id. at *5-8.
51. See DeLaney v. Thompson, 982 S.W.2d 857, 861 (Tenn. 1998)
("[T]he Tennessee Plan was inapplicable to the election to fill [the appellate
judge's] seat.
Vol. 39
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. IS THE TENNESSEE PLAN CONSTITUTIONAL?
The Tennessee Constitution requires all judges to be
"elected by the qualified voters"5 2 of the state. Yet, under the Ten-
nessee Plan, all judges are initially appointed by the governor and
then retained in uncontested retention referenda.53 In my essay, I
argued that both the appointment and retention features of the Ten-
nessee Plan are unconstitutional. First, I argued that, as a matter of
simple textualism, the appointment feature of the Plan is unconsti-
tutional because, although the constitution sometimes permits
judges to come to the bench by appointment rather than "elec-
tion," it does so only to fill "unexpired terms,""5 not, as the Ten-
nessee Plan requires, to fill all terms, whether unexpired or ex-
pired.56 Second, I argued that, as a matter of the original under-
standing of the constitution-a methodology often referred to as
"originalism" 57
-uncontested retention referenda are unconstitu-
tional because, when the constitutional provision requiring "elec-
tions" was written in 1870, uncontested retention referenda were
an unknown method of selecting public officials in the United
States.58 Third, I argued that, even if the original understanding is
put to one side, as a matter of vindicating the original purpose of
the 1870 Constitution-a methodology often referred to as "pur-
posivism" -the constitutionality of retention referenda is still
dubious. This is the case because the purpose behind the constitu-
52. TENN. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3, 4.
53. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 17-4-101, -102, -114 to -116 (1994 &
Supp. 2007).
54. See TENN. CONST. art. VII, § 4. ("[T]he filling of all vacancies not
otherwise directed or provided by this Constitution, shall be made in such man-
ner as the Legislature shall direct.").
55. Id. § 5 ("No appointment ... to fill a vacancy shall be made for a
period extending beyond the unexpired term.").
56. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 492.
57. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 38-39 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
58. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 494.
59. Michael C. Dorf, Foreward: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112
HARV. L. REv. 4, 4 (1998). This method of interpretation goes by many other
names, including "translation," Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L.
REv. 381, 395 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelty and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1365, 1371 (1997), and "conceptualism," ERwIN CHEMERINSKY,
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 108 (1987).
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tional provision requiring judicial elections was to foster greater
democratic accountability in the judiciary, and retention referenda
are arguably a poor substitute for contested elections in this regard
because incumbents virtually never lose referenda. That is, refer-
enda nearly approximate life tenure, which is the very antithesis of
democratic accountability. 60 At the same time, I noted that there
were some counterarguments on this point: contested elections in
Tennessee were not very competitive before the Tennessee Plan,
and there is some evidence that the prospect of losing in retention
referenda, even though remote, influences how judges behave on
the bench.61 Nonetheless, I noted that another method of constitu-
tional interpretation, what some call "popular constitutionalism, 62
might resolve any lingering ambiguity. In 1977, the citizens of
Tennessee were given a chance to resolve the constitutional debate
over the Tennessee Plan in the form of an amendment to the con-
stitution that would have, among other things, replaced the consti-
tutional language requiring elections with language providing for
the Tennessee Plan; voters rejected that amendment.63
Justice White appeared to suggest that there was something
idiosyncratic about my constitutional analysis; she asserted at one
point that I had "construct[ed] [my] own test" to assess the consti-
tutionality of the Tennessee Plan.6 This was most certainly not the
case. None of the methodologies I used in my essay-textualism,
originalism, purposivism, and popular constitutionalism-were my
own creation. Rather, they are some of the most common interpre-
tative methodologies used by courts and commentators today.65
60. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 495.
61. See id. at 497.
62. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REvIEw (2004); Saul Cornell, Mobs, Mili-
tas, and Magistrates: Popular Constitutionalism and the Whiskey Rebellion, 81
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 883 (2006).
63. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 498.
64. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 530.
65. For example, at least two of the nine Justices of the United States
Supreme Court, Justices Scalia and Thomas, are originalists, not to mention
countless commentators. See generally Keith Whittington, The New Original-
ism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 599 (2004) (citing a number of originalists).
Purposivism has even more adherents among courts and commentators. See
Klarman, supra note 59, at 395 (noting that many scholars and judges believe
that constitutions should be interpreted "by 'translating' the Framers' concepts
Vol. 39
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Moreover, I employed multiple methodologies for good reasons: a
single methodology is often indeterminate, and not everyone
agrees which methodologies are the best ones.66 My goal was to
show that the Tennessee Plan has constitutional infirmities from
many different perspectives.
The broader theme of Justice White's response to my con-
stitutional analysis was, again, that my essay was misleading.67
Her argument this time was that I omitted "essential cornerstones"
of constitutional and statutory interpretation from my analysis.68
As I explain below, none of these so-called "cornerstones" are per-
tinent to the points I made in my essay, and some of them are not
pertinent to any sort of constitutional analysis of the Tennessee
Plan. I also explain why Justice White's more specific responses
to the constitutional arguments I made in my essay do not cast
doubt on those arguments.
A. Stare Decisis?
As I noted in my original essay, there are two decisions by
the Tennessee Supreme Court, State ex rel. Higgins v. Dunn69 and
State ex rel. Hooker v. Thompson,0 that have addressed some of
the constitutional questions surrounding the Plan.7 As I also
noted, in both cases, the court upheld the Tennessee Plan against
the constitutional challenges raised therein.72 Justice White began
into modem circumstances"). Although popular constitutionalism is less well
subscribed, it, too, has many adherents. See supra note 62.
66. See RICHARD FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTTruTION 45 (2001)
("The implicit norms of our constitutional practice acknowledge the relevance of
at least five distinct forms of constitutional arguments ....").
67. See White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 501 ("It is impossible ... to
respond to Professor Fitzpatrick's essay without highlighting a multitude of
significant omissions that must be considered to fairly evaluate... the constitu-
tionality ... of the Tennessee Plan.").
68. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 522.
69. 496 S.W.2d 480 (Tenn. 1973).
70. 249 S.W.3d 331 (Tenn. 1996).
71. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 486-89.
72. See id. At one point, Justice White accused me of "ignor[ing] the fact
that Thompson relied on the precedent established twenty-five years earlier in
Dunn." White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 525. I will simply quote from my
original essay and let readers decide for themselves whether I "ignored" this
fact:
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her constitutional analysis by criticizing me for "disregard[ing]"
the doctrine of stare decisis with respect to these two decisions.73
At the same time, however, she also criticized me for making two
"specious, 7 4 "illogical,"75  "disturbing,,16 and "wholly unin-
formed"77 arguments in derogation of stare decisis. I am not sure
how I could have both disregarded stare decisis and made argu-
ments in derogation of it, but Justice White was correct the first
time: I did not discuss the doctrine of stare decisis in my essay. In
my view, I had some very good reasons for not doing so. Before I
turn to these reasons, however, I wish to address the two argu-
ments she said I made in derogation of the doctrine. One of these
arguments I never made, and the other one, which related to the
publication rules of the Tennessee Supreme Court and not the pru-
dential doctrine of stare decisis, I stand by in full.
As I observed in my original essay, in neither of the Ten-
nessee Supreme Court opinions upholding the Tennessee Plan did
a majority of the regularly constituted Tennessee Supreme Court
decide the cases. 8 In both instances, some (in Dunn) or all (in
Thompson) of the regular justices recused themselves and were
replaced by "special justices" appointed by the Chief Justice (in the
case of Dunn) and the governor (in the case of Thompson). 9 From
this simple observation, Justice White asserted that I made the
"specious," "illogical," "disturbing," and "wholly uninformed"8 °
In 1996, the suits in State ex rel. Hooker v. Thompson were
filed .... The litigation went up to the Tennessee Supreme
Court and was heard by a special panel of judges appointed by
the governor because all of the regular justices recused them-
selves. The special court held the Tennessee Plan constitu-
tional on the authority of Dunn.
Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 488 (emphasis added).
73. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 523-24.
74. Id. at 524 ("[T]he essay floats specious arguments against the princi-
ple's application ....").
75. Id. ("[T]he essay erects illogical arguments to challenge the princi-
ple's application .... ").
76. Id. at 513 (referring to "one of the more disturbing arguments in Pro-
fessor Fitzpatrick's essay").
77. Id. at 514 n.99 (criticizing an "assertion" she attributed to me as
"wholly uninformed").
78. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 489-90.
79. See id.
80. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 513, 514 n.99, 524.
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argument that "both Dunn and Thompson... have diminished pre-
cedential value because they were authored by 'special' and not
'regular' justices of the Tennessee Supreme Court.",8' Not only did
I never make this argument, but I explicitly stated precisely the
opposite. I said very clearly that "as a formal legal matter, deci-
sions by special justices are just as binding as those rendered by
regular justices."82 My only point in making the observation that a
regular court has never upheld the Plan was to suggest that this is
one reason why the controversy over the Plan may not have sub-
sided. 3 Justice White appears to have completely misunderstood
this. Unfortunately, this misunderstanding has rendered several
pages of her response irrelevant. 4
The second argument that Justice White criticized as "spe-
cious"85 is at least an argument that I did make. I argued that one
of the two Tennessee Supreme Court decisions addressing the con-
stitutionality of the Tennessee Plan, Thompson, had never been
published, and therefore, under the rules of the Tennessee Supreme
Court, it constituted only persuasive and not binding authority.
8 6
Justice White said I was wrong about this, that even unpublished
87Supreme Court opinions are binding in future cases. As there is
no delicate way to disagree with a former Supreme Court Justice
about the rules of her own court, I will simply quote what her court
has said on this matter: "While not controlling authority, unpub-
lished decisions of this Court are entitled to at least the same re-
81. Id. at 513.
82. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 490.
83. See id. at 490.
84. Thus, for example, Justice White's claim that my "argument" would
create "decisional chaos" because "[e]ither 'regular' judges would be forced to
decide matters in which they had an interest ... or substitute judges would ren-
der a decision that was of no value," White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 524-25,
is entirely misplaced because I never made the "argument" that she said I did. It
should also be noted that other judicial systems take different approaches to the
problem of conflicts by all of the members of their highest courts without any
resulting "decisional chaos." See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213
(1980) (holding that all Supreme Court Justices can hear a case, even though
they all have a conflict of interest, because no other Article III judge would be
without the same conflict).
85. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 524.
86. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 488-89.
87. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 524-25.
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spect [as unpublished decisions of intermediate appellate courts]."8
I am not the only commentator to understand this decision to mean
what it says: "a previous unreported Supreme Court decision is not
controlling authority, but it is entitled to persuasive force." 9
It is important to reiterate, however, that my point about
Thompson was entirely technical. As I noted in my original essay,
Thompson was not published due to an oversight, and, when I
brought this oversight to the attention of the office of the Attorney
General, the office said it might correct the error.90 Thus, as I pre-
dicted in my original essay,9' the decision has now been pub-
lished,92 and under the Supreme Court's rules, is now binding.
In any event, as I said, Justice White was correct when she
first asserted that I "disregard[ed]" the doctrine of stare decisis in
my essay. I do not believe, however, that this was an "omission." 93
Rather, there are three rather obvious reasons why stare decisis
was largely irrelevant to the arguments I made in my original es-
say.
The first reason is that the three constitutional questions I
raised were not considered by the Tennessee Supreme Court in
either of its two decisions upholding the Plan.94 It is a common
principle of stare decisis that the doctrine does not apply to argu-
ments that were never considered in previous decisions. Indeed,
the Tennessee Supreme Court adopted this principle almost one
hundred years ago, when it struck down a statute as unconstitu-
tional, even though the same statute had previously been upheld
against a similar constitutional challenge, because the new chal-
lenge relied on a new argument. 95 As the court said, "it is a famil-
88. McConnell v. State, 12 S.W.3d 795, 799 n.5 (Tenn. 2000) (emphasis
added and noting that "[u]npublished intermediate court opinions have persua-
sive force").
89. 2 LAWRENCE A. PIVNICK, TENNESSEE CIRCUIT COURT PRACTICE §
30:20 (2008 ed.).
90. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 489 n. 143.
91. See id.
92. See State ex rel. Hooker v. Thompson, 249 S.W.3d 331 (Tenn. 1996).
93. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 524.
94. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 475 ("[N]either of these decisions even
attempted to address three of the most serious constitutional questions raised by
the Plan.").
95. See State ex rel. Pitts v. Nashville Baseball Club, 154 S.W. 1151,
1155 (Tenn. 1913). The statute was held unconstitutional because it violated
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iar principle that stare decisis only applies with reference to deci-
sions directly upon the point in controversy" and only "'in respect
of decisions directly upon the points in issue.'"96
Second, even if Dunn and Thompson would foreclose any
consideration by the Tennessee Supreme Court of the arguments I
raised in my original essay, I did not think a discussion of stare
decisis was relevant because I did not direct my arguments to the
Tennessee Supreme Court; I directed them to the Tennessee legis-
lature.97 It is another longstanding principle that, in republican
governments, where power is separated into co-equal branches,
members of each branch, all of whom usually take their own oaths
to uphold the constitution," are entitled to their own independent
view of what is and is not constitutional." Although the judiciary
may have the last word on the constitution in litigation, the politi-
cal branches have the last word in legislation. That is, it has long
been thought that, even though the judicial branch might think a
piece of legislation is constitutional, members of the legislative and
Article 2, § 18, of the Tennessee Constitution on account of the fact that it had
not been read three times in the Senate before it was enacted. See id. The pre-
vious challenge was based on a different argument using the exact same consti-
tutional provision. See id.
96. Id. (quoting Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 574
(1895)); see also Denny v. Wilson County, 281 S.W.2d 671, 674 n.4 (Tenn.
1955) ("Where an applicable rule, statute or common law is overlooked in the
decision of a case, such decision is no authority ...."); Bums v. Duncan, 133
S.W.2d 1000, 1008 (Tenn. 1939) (refusing to follow precedent holding that a
sheriff could be sued in a particular venue because "the above cited statute in-
voked by the defendants in the case now before us was not brought to the atten-
tion of the Court, and was not in the mind of the Court when [it] was decided").
97. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 500 (concluding that "the best read-
ing of the Tennessee Constitution is one that holds the Tennessee Plan unconsti-
tutional" and arguing that "the legislature--duty bound as it is to uphold the
Tennessee Constitution-should do what it needs to do to return the selection of
appellate judges to contested elections").
98. See, e.g., TENN. CONST. art. X, § 2 ("Each member of the Senate and
House of Representatives, shall before they proceed to business take an oath or
affirmation to support the Constitution of this State .... ).
99. See, e.g., Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of
Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707, 740-41 (1985) ("Acting like a lower federal
court is certainly not what Jefferson envisioned for Congress; Congress should
be able to make its own decisions rather than having to predict what the Su-
preme Court would do .... ").
2008
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executive branches are still free to vote against the legislation on
the basis of their independent view of the constitutional merits.'00
Indeed, one of the most famous examples of this practice
has its roots in Tennessee. In 1832, Tennessean Andrew Jackson,
while President of the United States, vetoed a bill that would have
reauthorized the Second Bank of the United States because he
thought the Bank was unconstitutional. 1 He did this even though
the Supreme Court had declared that the Bank was indeed constitu-
tional.1 °2 There is nothing to stop members of the Tennessee legis-
lature from likewise refusing to reauthorize the Tennessee Plan on
constitutional grounds even if they believe that the Tennessee Su-
preme Court would disagree with these grounds. Given Justice
White's repeated invocation of the "preeminen [ce]"° 3 of the legis-
lature, as well as her endorsement of deference to the legislature in
constitutional interpretation,' 4 one might have thought that she
would have been especially attracted to these longstanding norms.
Finally, even if all of this were not reason enough to omit a
discussion of stare decisis, I also did not address the doctrine be-
cause my essay was an academic work, not a piece of litigation.
Law professors thoughtfully criticize decisions rendered by courts
all the time. That is the very point of the scholarly enterprise. If
law professors were forbidden from doing so, they would not have
much to do, and the law reviews would have nothing with which to
fill their pages. Law professors do not do this in vain; we do it
because one never knows when a court will read something in a
law review and change its mind. As Justice White well knows,
stare decisis is not an inexorable command. At least once in her
tenure on the Tennessee Supreme Court she voted to overrule a
precedent of that court-and she did so on the basis (at least in
part) of academic criticism.05
100. See, e.g., id. at 744 ("Even after courts hand down a decision, there
are opportunities for Congress to test the soundness of the decision by passing
new legislation and supporting further litigation.").
101. See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), reprinted in 2 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576-82
(James Richardson ed., 1907).
102. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
103. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 502-03.
104. See id. at 522-23.
105. See State v. Reeves, 916 S.W.2d 909, 914 (Tenn. 1996) (joining opin-
ion overturning precedent because of "persuasive criticisms" of previous deci-
102 Vol. 39
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B. The Essential Principles of (Statutory?) Interpretation?
Justice White also criticized my essay for omitting consid-
eration of three "basic principles of statutory construction and con-
stitutional interpretation."' 6 Readers can decide for themselves
whether any of these principles contribute meaningfully to the dis-
cussion of whether the Tennessee Plan is constitutional.
To begin with, two of the three "basic principles" are, as
she herself noted, principles of statutory interpretation. One prin-
ciple says that, "[i]f a statute lends itself to more than one con-
struction, the construction that upholds constitutionality must be
applied."' 7 The other principle is one that says "[i]n construing
statutes, [courts] look at the objects aimed at by the Legislature,
and not to the particular verbiage, in which a statute, in some of its
parts, may be expressed."'' 8 I have a hard time understanding how
either of these principles of statutory interpretation is relevant to a
single thing I said in my essay. I did not argue-and, as far as I am
aware, no one has argued-that the statutory provisions compris-
ing the Tennessee Plan are ambiguous. The debate is whether the
statutory provisions are constitutional. I am therefore puzzled as to
why Justice White decided to focus her response on questions of
the proper interpretation of the Tennessee Plan statutes.'09
Although Justice White also referred to her third "basic
principle" as a "principle of statutory construction,' " ° I think she
probably meant this last principle is one of constitutional interpre-
tation, and therefore, at least potentially relevant to the constitu-
tional questions I raised in my original essay. The principle is that
courts should "presume" that statutes duly enacted by the legisla-
ture are constitutional and "indulge 'every presumption' in favor of
constitutional validity.'"" This is a very fine principle of constitu-
sion) (citing Jerome Hall, Criminal Attempt- A Study of Foundations of Criminal
Liability, 49 YALE L.J. 789, 821-22 (1940); Barbara Baum Levenbook, Prohib-
iting Attempts and Preparations, 49 UMKC L. REV. 41 (1980); Herbert
Wechsler et al., The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of
the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 COLUM.
L. REV. 571, 586-611 (1961)).
106. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 522.
107. Id. at 523.
108. Id. (quoting Arrington v. Cotton, 60 Tenn. 316, 319-20 (1872)).
109. See id. at 522-23, 526-27.
110. Id. at 522.
111. Id.
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tional interpretation. It is one that I myself subscribe to, although
it is not as much in vogue these days as it used to be.112 I did not
invoke the principle that courts should defer to legislatures, how-
ever, because the constitutional arguments in my essay were,
again, not directed to courts, but to the legislature. That is, a prin-
ciple that tells one branch of government (the judiciary) what to do
vis-A-vis another (the legislature) does not help the other branch
(the legislature) decide what to do in the first instance. As I noted
above, members of the Tennessee legislature are free to make their
own independent determination of whether the Tennessee Plan is
constitutional and to vote their consciences accordingly in their
2009 session.
C. Are Judges "Elected" if They are Initially Appointed
by the Governor?
I argued in my essay that the feature of the Tennessee Plan
that calls on the governor to appoint all appellate judges in the first
instance was unconstitutional insofar as it permitted the governor
to appoint new judges to the bench when their predecessors served
their entire terms." 3 I argued that this was unconstitutional be-
cause, although the Tennessee Constitution allows "vacancies"'14
on the courts to be filled by gubernatorial appointment rather than
election, it also says that "[n]o appointment .. . to fill a vacancy
shall be made for a period extending beyond the unexpired
term.""' 5 Thus, I argued, to the extent that there is no unexpired
term to fill--e.g., because a judge has served his or her entire term
and decides not to run for reelection-the judge's successor must
be elected rather than appointed. 116
Justice White's response to this argument was to note that
judges appointed under the Tennessee Plan must run in retention
referenda within two years of their appointment. That is, she noted
that, even if an appointed judge's predecessor served his or her
112. See KRAMER, supra note 62, at 65, 228 (noting that, at the founding,
judicial review was premised on the notion that "laws should be declared void
only if 'unconstitutional beyond dispute"' and that modem judicial review
"represents a profound change from what we have seen was historically the
case").
113. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 491-92.
114. TENN. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
115. Id. § 5 (emphasis added).
116. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 491-92.
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entire term (and there was, therefore, no unexpired term to fill), the
newly appointed judge will not forever be able "to avoid an elec-
tion." '' The trouble with this response, however, is that I did not
contend that judges appointed under the Tennessee Plan would
forever be able to avoid an election. I contended that they would
be able to do so for as long as two years."' That is permitted by
the constitution when the judge was appointed to fill an "unexpired
term."' 19 There is nothing in the constitution, however, that permits
the governor to appoint a judge to fill an "expired term." Justice
White's only response to this point was to embark on a lengthy
discourse on the meaning of the word "vacancy" in the constitution
and in the Tennessee Plan's statutory provisions. 20  As I have
noted above, none of her discourse on the meaning of the statute is
relevant because, as I made clear in my original essay, I do not
dispute-and I know of no one who does dispute-that the Ten-
nessee Plan permits the governor to appoint judges to expired
terms. 21 The relevant question is whether this is constitutional.
On this question, Justice White's focus on the meaning of the word
"vacancy" was incomplete. In order to appoint rather than elect
judges, the constitution requires not only a "vacancy," but also that
the "vacancy" arise during an "unexpired term."' 22 Justice White
had nothing to say about the meaning of the phrase "unexpired
term," and, indeed, it is difficult to see how those words could be
twisted to permit the governor to appoint judges to "expired
terms."
D. Are Retention Referenda "Elections"?
I also argued in my original essay that the retention feature
of the Tennessee Plan is unconstitutional. Although Article VI of
the Tennessee Constitution requires all judges to be "elected by the
117. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 525-26.
118. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 491 ("[T]hey can serve for as long as
two years before they are put before the people in retention referenda.").
119. TENN. CONST. art. VII, § 5.
120. See White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 526-27.
121. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 482 (noting that the Tennessee Plan
permits gubernatorial appointment "not only [to] interim vacancies" but also
where "the [previous] judge completed an eight-year term and did not run for
reelection") (emphasis added).
122. TENN. CONST. art. VII, §§ 4, 5.
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qualified voters of the state,"1 23 the Tennessee Plan does not call for
judges to be retained in traditional, contested elections but rather in
yes-or-no referenda where judges face no opponents. 4 I argued
that retention referenda are inconsistent with the 1870 Constitu-
tion's requirement of "election by the qualified voters" because the
authors of the 1870 Constitution would not have understood these
words to include retention referenda; retention referenda were un-
known in the United States at that time (they did not become
known until 1914).125 Indeed, for 100 years after the 1870 Consti-
tution was ratified, judges ran in contested elections just like other
public officials.1 26 Although I noted that, in Article II of the 1870
Constitution, the word "election" is used to refer to a yes-or-no
vote by citizens to approve loans issued by municipalities,'127 I ar-
gued that ballot propositions of that sort had always taken place in
yes-or-no form, and in light of the fact that the election of public
officials had never taken place in yes-or-no form, the framers of
the 1870 Constitution might have understood the word "election"
in Article VI to mean something different.2 8 Although we often
assume the same word means the same thing in every usage
throughout a document, sometimes we do not.129 The same words
in the United States Constitution, for example, sometimes mean
one thing in one provision and something else in a different provi-
sion. 30 Context, of course, matters.'
123. Id. art. VI, §§ 3, 4.
124. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 17-4-114 to -116 (1994 & Supp. 2007).
125. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 493-94.
126. See N. Houston Parks, Judicial Selection-The Tennessee Experi-
ence, 7 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 615, 628-34 (1977).
127. See TENN. CONST. art. II, § 29.
128. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 493-94.
129. Cf., e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 595
(2004) (noting that the "presumption that identical words used in different parts
of the same act are intended to have the same meaning" is "not rigid and readily
yields whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the words are
used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in differ-
ent parts of the act with different intent" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
130. For example, although some provisions in the U.S. Constitution in-
voking the word "state" have been interpreted to include the District of Colum-
bia, see National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 617-26
(1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring in the result), others have not, see U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 2 ('"The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members cho-
106 Vol. 39
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Justice White did not deny that retention referenda were
unknown in 1870, nor did she respond to the argument that the
word "election" might have been understood differently in the con-
text of public officials than it was in the context of ballot proposi-
tions. Rather, she appeared to disavow the originalist methodology
altogether. 112 This is fair enough because, as I noted above, not
everyone agrees on the best interpretative methodology. That is
precisely why I analyzed this question using other methodologies.
For example, I argued that, even if we interpret constitutional pro-
visions to take on new meanings, we often do so only when the
new meanings serve the original purposes of the provisions.'33 But
under the purposivist methodology, too, the constitutionality of
retention referenda is in doubt.3 4 The animating purpose behind
the movement toward the election of judges in Tennessee and
elsewhere was to inject more democratic accountability into the
policy decisions rendered by judges,'35 yet incumbent judges who
run in retention referenda are virtually never defeated (the reten-
tion rate in Tennessee is 99.3%).136 That is, retention referenda are
arguably little more than life tenure, which, of course, is the very
antithesis of democratic accountability. On the other hand, I noted
that judges who run in retention referenda nevertheless report that
their decisions are influenced by public opinion, 37 and, before the
sen ... by the People of the several States .... "); id. § 3 ("The Senate ... shall
be composed of two Senators from each State .... ").
131. Given that I explicitly based my argument on the 1870 understanding
of the word "election" in the context of public officials, it is difficult to know
what to make of Justice White's claim that my argument was based on nothing
other than "[my] own definition of 'election."' White & Reddick, supra note 7,
at 527.
132. See id. at 529 ("[C]onstitutions are intended to provide a general out-
line conducive to flexible interpretation .... ").
133. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 494-97.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 477-78 ("Most historians attribute the change in judicial
selection to a shift in this country's attitude about democracy ... .
136. See id. at 485.
137. See id. at 497. ("Although judges who run in referenda are virtually
guaranteed to win, they nonetheless report on surveys that the prospect of run-
ning in the referenda influences their decisions on the bench. Thus, it is possible
that retention referenda produce judges that are accountable to the public even
though they do not produce judges who get defeated."). Thus, although Justice
White attributed to me the statement that "democracy fails unless judges are
2008
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Tennessee Plan, elections in Tennessee were not very spirited be-
cause Tennessee was a one-party state."' Thus, I argued that it is
not entirely clear that retention referenda are a poor substitute for
contested elections even from the perspective of democratic ac-
countability.
In her response, Justice White seemed to suggest that "de-
mocratic accountability" could not have been the original purpose
of the constitutional provision requiring an elected judiciary be-
cause "accountability to majority rule... has never been the model
for the American justice system."139 There is not, however, only
one "model for the American Justice system. ' ° There are many
models, and Justice White appeared to choose the wrong one by
which to measure the constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan. Jus-
tice White's "model for the American Justice system" is the fed-
eral judicial system. The Tennessee Plan, however, does not
select federal judges; it selects state judges, and Tennessee's judi-
ciary has been designed much differently than has the federal judi-
ciary. As I noted in my original essay, although at the time of the
founding of the United States, states followed the federal govern-
ment in designing unelected judiciaries where judges held their
seats for life, that changed in the wake of Andrew Jackson's presi-
dency. 4'2  The vast majority of states, including Tennessee,
changed their judiciaries in the nineteenth century away from the
federal model and toward popular election without life tenure.143
defeated," White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 533, I, yet again, explicitly said
precisely the opposite in my original essay.
138. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 497.
139. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 530-32. She also appeared to
argue that, if considerations of democratic accountability influence the interpre-
tation of the words "elected by the qualified voters of the state," then these con-
siderations must influence the interpretation of every other phrase of the Ten-
nessee Constitution. Id. at 530 ("If the provisions of the 1870 constitution must
accomplish 'democratic accountability,' . . . then dozens of provisions of the
Tennessee constitution and hundreds of Tennessee statutes are invalid."). It is
difficult to know what to make of this argument. Obviously, different provi-
sions of the constitution have different purposes and each provision should be
interpreted in light of its own purposes.
140. See id. at 532.
141. See id. (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring)).
142. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 477.
143. See id.
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The reason for these changes, at least according to countless histo-
rians, was to give the public more control over the decision making
of the courts.'" Thus, for better or for worse, the Tennessee Con-
stitution strikes a different balance between judicial independence
and democratic accountability than does the federal constitution.
These differences obviously need to be respected when interpreting
the Tennessee Constitution.
Rather than grapple with these differences, however, Jus-
tice White appeared to rest her constitutional analysis on some-
thing of a formalism. She argued that retention referenda must
qualify as "elections" under the 1870 Constitution because all that
is required for something to be an "election" is for voters to have
some ability to "choose.' 45 Her definition of "election" came from
a 1989 dictionary and other contemporary documents, '4 but even
by contemporary standards, it is not entirely clear that every time
citizens are presented with a "choice" at the ballot box we are will-
ing to call it an "election." Many communist nations, for example,
purport to hold "elections" by permitting voters to go to the polls
and "choose" between hand-picked candidates and no one else, '47
yet most of us do not think that these events are "elections" be-
cause they are "elections" only in form, not in substance. Under
the retention referenda of the Tennessee Plan, voters have only
ever had the "choice" between an incumbent and "none of the
144. See id. at 477-78 & n.33.
145. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 528 (defining "'elect' to mean 'to
choose').
146. See id. at 528 & nn.180-81 (citing OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
115 (2d ed. 1989); Erica Klarreich, Election Selection, 162 Sci. NEWS 280
(2002); Pippa Norris, Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportionate, Majoritarian,
and Mixed, 18 INT'L POL. Sci. REv. 297 (1997)).
147. See Cubans Ratify Castro, New Slate of Candidates, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Jan. 21, 2008, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22761365/.
Cubans ratified a slate of parliamentary candidates on Sunday
including Fidel Castro .... Only one choice appeared for
each post in districts across the country and there was no cam-
paigning. The Communist Party is the only party
allowed .... Candidates lose if they do not get more than 50
percent of the vote, although National Assembly officials
don't remember that happening since Cubans began voting for
parliament in 1993.
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above." Is that enough of a "choice" to constitute an "election?"
Formalism cannot answer this question.
Finally, it must be noted that Justice White's formalism
leads to some very strange results. Justice White was forced to
concede that, if her interpretation of the Tennessee Constitution is
accepted, then the legislature could abolish contested elections for
other public officials, including the governor. 4 That is, in Justice
White's view, even though the Tennessee Constitution requires
governors to be selected by "election,"'' 49 they need never run
against an opponent again. Needless to say, this is not how execu-
tives are usually selected in democratic governments; it is, again,
the manner of selection in communist and other totalitarian gov-
ernments-governments that, as I noted above, like to put on only
the guise of elections. Readers can decide for themselves whether
they wish to follow Justice White down this road.
E. What About the Failed Amendment of 1977?
In my original essay, I suggested that, to the extent there
was any ambiguity over whether the Tennessee Plan was constitu-
tional using the methodologies I outlined above, that ambiguity
might be resolved by using a final methodology, one called "popu-
lar constitutionalism." The theory behind this methodology is that
we should not see constitutional interpretation as the exclusive
domain of political elites, but rather, as a dialogue with the pub-
lic."O In this vein, I asked whether the Tennessee Constitution
should be interpreted in light of a salient moment of public expres-
sion about the constitutionality of the Tennessee Plan: in 1977,
voters rejected an amendment to the Tennessee Constitution that
would have, among other things, replaced the constitutional provi-
sion requiring all judges to be "elected" with a provision that set
forth the provisions of the Tennessee Plan.' It was the first con-
148. See White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 529 ("The simple truth is that
the legislature could do so. It would not be unconstitutional... to have a reten-
tion election for governor or for any elected office.").
149. TENN. CONST. art. Ill, § 4.
150. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 62, at 7 ("[Ilt was the people them-
selves-working through and responding to their agents in government-who
were responsible for seeing that [the Constitution] was properly interpreted and
implemented.").
151. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 497-99.
Vol. 39
HeinOnline  -- 39 U. Mem. L. Rev. 110 2008-2009
Errors, Omissions, and the Tennessee Plan
stitutional amendment proposed by a limited constitutional con-
vention ever to fail in Tennessee. 12
I noted in my essay that it is always difficult to interpret the
significance of a rejected constitutional amendment because
amendments can be rejected for any number of reasons. 53 Accord-
ingly, I noted that the defeated amendment was "not conclusive" in
my mind.1 4 Nonetheless, I argued that the defeated amendment,
when combined with the other doubts about the constitutionality of
the Tennessee Plan, might create a sufficient basis, at least for
those inclined to think that the legislature should be solicitous of
the constitutional views of the public, to jettison the Tennessee
Plan until the public is given another opportunity to amend the
constitution.'55 Indeed, I noted that Tennessee is the only state in
the United States with a system of judicial selection relying upon
gubernatorial appointment and retention referenda that has not
amended its constitutional provision requiring an elected judici-
156
ary.
Justice White called this analysis "indefensible," but again,
her colorful commentary appears to be based on a misunderstand-
ing of my essay.1 57 She asserted that, from the "complex and intri-
cate history" of the 1977 vote, I "urge[d] one conclusion: [t]he
people rejected the judiciary amendment because they wanted an
elected judiciary. 1 58 As I just noted, however, I said nothing of the
sort. I explicitly said that "[tihe amendment containing the Ten-
nessee Plan would have made many other significant changes to
the judicial branch" and that "[ilt is possible that the voters favored
the Tennessee Plan but rejected the amendment for the other
152. See LEWIS L. LASKA, THE TENNESSEE STATE CONSTITUTION 26
(1990).
153. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 498 (stating, for example, that "[t]he
amendment containing the Tennessee Plan would have made many other signifi-
cant changes to the judicial branch" and that "[i]t is possible that the voters ...
rejected the amendment for the other changes it would have made").
154. Id.
155. See id. at 498-99.
156. See id.
157. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 534.
158. Id.
2008
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changes it would have made. . . ,," This is one reason why I said
the failure of the 1977 amendment was "not conclusive."'' 6
In any event, although it is certainly true that we cannot be
sure why the voters rejected the Tennessee Plan in 1977, this is the
case every time amendments fail, 161 yet we nonetheless use failed
amendments to interpret constitutional provisions all the time.' 62 I
noted one example of this in my original essay: an opinion joined
by several U.S. Supreme Court Justices interpreting the Eleventh
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in light of an amendment that
failed in Congress. 63 Justice White asserted that the relevance of
this case is "totally illusory" because the question in the case was
whether "suits by Indian tribes against states had been authorized
by Congress consistent with the Eleventh Amendment."' 64 It is not
clear from Justice White's description of this case, however, why
159. Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 498.
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive
Force of the Constitution's Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1209-10
(2003) (noting that "[i]t is not always clear ... that the rejection of proposed
language ... is direct evidence that Congress decided not to adopt the specific
policy in question" because "[s]ometimes the rejection of an amendment or
proposal reflects a belief that the amendment or proposal was unnecessary," and
that "negative inferences are considerably more slippery in constitutional inter-
pretation").
162. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 398 & n.21 (1989)
("No comparable restriction [in the Constitution] applies to judges, and we find
it at least inferentially meaningful that.., two prohibitions against plural office-
holding.., were proposed, but did not reach the floor... for a vote."); Morri-
son v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 699 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Proposals to
have [in the Constitution] multiple executives, or a council of advisers with
separate authority were rejected."). We do the same for statutory provisions.
See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987) ("Few princi-
ples of statutory construction are more compelling than the proposition that
Congress does not intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has ear-
lier discarded in favor of other language." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
163. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 111 (1996)
(Souter, J., dissenting) ("If the Framers had meant the Amendment to bar fed-
eral-question suits as well, they could not only have made their intentions
clearer very easily, but could simply have adopted the first post-Chisholm pro-
posal, introduced in the House of Representatives by Theodore
Sedgwick....").
164. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 534 n.217.
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she thought its relevance was "totally illusory." '  It is true that the
case involved Indian tribes, 66 but I do not know why that means it
should be disregarded. The question in the case, as Justice White
herself noted, involved how to interpret the Eleventh Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution. 161 I invoked the case because several Su-
preme Court Justices argued that the Eleventh Amendment should
be interpreted in light of a constitutional amendment that had failed
(even though it may not have been possible to know for sure why
the amendment failed). 168 There are many other judicial decisions
interpreting constitutional provisions in light of failed amend-
ments, 169 not to mention countless articles by scholars endorsing
the approach. 170 Moreover, the approach has been used not only for
amendments rejected contemporaneously with the enactment of the
relevant constitutional provision, but also for amendments rejected
long after the relevant provisions were enacted.
7
'
165. Id.
166. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44.
167. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 534 n.217.
168. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 111.
169. See supra note 162.
170. See, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 161, at 1209-12 (endorsing
the approach "with extra caution"); David B. Kopel, It Isn't About Duck Hunt-
ing: The British Origins of the Right to Arms, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1333, 1357
(1995) (arguing that "the 'National Guard' interpretation of the Second
Amendment amounts to an Orwellian reversal [by] treating the enacted
Amendment that guarantees the right of the people as having a meaning identi-
cal to a proposed but rejected amendment dealing with the rights of states");
Glen V. Salyer, Free Exercise in Illinois: Does the State Constitution Envision
Constitutionally Compelled Religious Exemptions?, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 197,
205-06 (1998) (arguing that the Free Exercise Clause in the Illinois Constitution
should not be interpreted like the Free Exercise Clause in the U.S. Constitution
because the language used in the U.S. Constitution was proposed for the Illinois
Constitution and rejected); Bernard Schwartz, "Shooting the Piano Player?"
Justice Scalia and Administrative Law, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 11 (1995) (arguing
that the U.S. Constitution should not be interpreted to embody a strict separation
of powers because an amendment embodying such a separation was proposed
and rejected).
171. See, e.g., David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The His-
torical Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98
MICH. L. REv. 1075, 1275-77 (2000) (arguing that the rejection of the Bricker
Amendment "enhanced" the constitutional case for the view of the treaty power
in Missouri v. Holland because "[h]aving been decisively defeated in the realm
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It is possible that Justice White's point was that it is more
difficult to know what to make of amendments rejected by the pub-
lic than amendments rejected by Congress.' If that was her point,
then I am skeptical of it. In many states, citizens are permitted to
enact constitutional provisions by popular vote, and accordingly,
courts are often called upon to interpret the meaning of this activ-
ity.'73 As far as I can tell, courts interpret constitutional provisions
in light of amendments rejected by voters in much the same way
they do amendments rejected by the legislature. 74
The short of the matter is this: every other state that
adopted a selection method like Tennessee's amended its constitu-
tion in order to do so (a point Justice White nowhere disputed), and
when Tennessee voters had the chance to do the same, they did not
take it. For those who think popular expressions of constitutional
meaning are relevant to constitutional analysis, the public's rejec-
tion of the Tennessee Plan suggests caution before concluding that
the Plan is constitutional. This is the case even though it cannot be
known whether the public rejected the amendment because it in-
cluded the Tennessee Plan or for other reasons. Where there is
uncertainty in the public's view, the response from popular consti-
tutionalism should be to clarify the uncertainty, not to ignore it. It
was for this reason that I argued the legislature should give the
public another chance to express themselves more clearly on this
point before reauthorizing the Plan. If Justice White truly believes
that the people of Tennessee want the Tennessee Plan, then she
should have no problem putting it to another vote.
of constitutional politics, there would seem to be little basis for revisiting the
question today through judicial construction").
172. See White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 534 ('There is no legal basis
for using the public's vote to evaluate the constitutionality of a legislative en-
actment.").
173. See, e.g., In re Proposal C, 185 N.W.2d 9, 14 (Mich. 1971).
174. See, e.g., Justin Levitt & Michael P. McDonald, Taking the "Re" out
of Redistricting: State Constitutional Provisions on Redistricting Timing, 95
GEO. L.J. 1247, 1258 n.49 (2007) (noting that, when interpreting constitutional
provisions, "states have in the past compared current text with prior provisions
or failed amendments"); Richard Shattuck, A Cry for Reform in Construing
Washington Municipal Corporation Statutes, 59 WASH. L. REv. 653, 671 (1984)
("[Ilf a proposed constitutional amendment failed to receive voter approval, the
supreme court could interpret the failure as the will of the people that the powers
of municipal corporations be interpreted very narrowly.").
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III. Is MERIT SELECTION GOOD PUBLIC POLICY?
Ms. Reddick's portion of the response was dedicated to a
number of policy arguments in favor of merit-selection systems
like the Tennessee Plan.' Although Ms. Reddick did not suggest
that these points bear on the question of whether the Tennessee
Plan is constitutional, 7 1 the legislature will no doubt consider ques-
tions of public policy when it decides whether to reauthorize the
Tennessee Plan in 2009. For this reason, I will explain why I be-
lieve Ms. Reddick may have overstated the evidence in favor of
merit-selection systems.
A. Do Merit Systems Select Judges with More Merit?
Ms. Reddick acknowledged that the research is mixed on
whether merit selection produces better qualified judges than do
elections.'7 She conceded that "[t]he most comprehensive analysis
of this kind reported that merit-selected and popularly-elected state
high court judges did not differ significantly in the extent of their
legal or judicial experience . . . ."' She also conceded that
"elected judges [a]re more productive than merit-selected
judges.' ' 79 Nonetheless, she asserted that judges who come to the
bench through merit selection are "more likely than popularly-
elected judges to have attended prestigious law schools"'8 and
write "higher quality" opinions.' She further asserted that elected
judges are disciplined more frequently than judges in merit sys-
tems, and that surveys of lawyers for corporations rate judges in
states with merit selection higher than judges in states with elected
judiciaries. 2
175. See White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 535-43.
176. See id.
177. Id. at 537.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. (citing Henry R. Glick & Craig F. Emmert, Selection Systems and
Judicial Characteristics: The Recruitment of State Supreme Court Judges, 70
JUDICATURE 228, 231-33 (1987)).
181. Id. (citing Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Profes-
sionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than
Appointed Judiciary, (Univ. of Chi. Sch. of Law, John M. Olin Law & Econ.
Working Paper No. 357, 2007), available at SSRN:http://ssm.com/abstract
=1008989).
182. Id. at 537-38.
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Although Ms. Reddick conceded this evidence presents
only a mixed case for the Tennessee Plan, I think the evidence is
even more uncertain than she acknowledged. For example, al-
though it is true that the Glick-Emmert study found that judges in
merit-selection states were more likely than judges in other sys-
tems to attend "prestigious law schools," the study noted that
"[t]he total number is small, however."'83  The study also con-
cluded in rather unequivocal terms that "the evidence is clear that
merit selection judges do not possess greater judicial credentials
than judges in other states. ' ' 4
Similarly, although Ms. Reddick was quite right that the
Choi-Gulati-Posner study found that judges in merit-selection
states tend to write opinions that are cited in other jurisdictions (the
study's proxy for "high quality" opinions) at a higher rate than do
elected judges, the study also found that the greater productivity of
elected judges more than outweighed the greater out-of-state cita-
tion rate of merit-selection judges. 85 That is, the study found that
judges in elected states received a greater absolute number of out-
of-state citations l1 6 Thus, if the unit of analysis is the judge rather
than the opinion, elected systems are superior to merit-selection
systems even on this metric. 
81
Moreover, it is hard to know what, if anything, can be in-
ferred from the surveys of corporate lawyers upon which Ms. Red-
dick relied. To begin with, the corporate lawyers surveyed obvi-
ously make up a very small and unrepresentative slice of the pub-
lic. In addition, Ms. Reddick's conclusions from these surveys
were based on a comparison of ratings from different states.
States, however, are different from each other in many ways other
than their methods of judicial selection, and Ms. Reddick nowhere
183. Glick & Emmert, supra note 180, at 231.
184. Id. at 233.
185. See Choi et al., supra note 181, at 17.
186. Id.
187. See RICHARD POSNER, How JUDGES THiNK 138 & n.18 (2008) (de-
scribing the Choi-Gulati-Posner study to find that "state supreme court justices
receive more citations in judicial opinions from judges in other states the less
secure their tenure is" because, although "[t]he appointed judges receive more
citations per opinion, [t]he elected judges write more opinions, and the relative
number of opinions is greater than the relative number of citations per opinion").
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attempted to control for any of these differences. This renders her
comparisons suspect from a scientific perspective. 181
The same can be said for Ms. Reddick's reliance on the dif-
ferent rates at which judges have been disciplined. None of the
studies she cited attempted to assess whether the different rates of
discipline they observed were statistically significant as opposed to
the result of random chance.8 9 Moreover, at least one of the stud-
ies compared completely different types of courts to one another.' 9
A scientific assessment of these comparisons would need to try,
again, to control for any other relevant differences between such
courts; no such effort was attempted. Finally, even if these scien-
tific obstacles could be overcome, it is worth noting that the total
number of judges who were disciplined was extremely small in all
of Ms. Reddick's studies. Thus, whatever advantage merit selec-
tion might offer on this point could be easily outweighed by the
many other considerations that go into selecting a judicial system.
B. Do Merit Systems Select More Diverse Judges?
Ms. Reddick acknowledged that the studies on whether
merit systems select judges with more racial and gender diversity
have been "inconsistent."' 9' Nonetheless, she went on to suggest
188. See, e.g., John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence,
and Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1997) (not-
ing the empirical difficulties with interstate comparisons); Steven Raphael &
Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on Crime, 44 J.L.
& ECON. 259, 266 (2001) (same).
189. See Steven Zeidman, To Elect or Not to Elect: A Case Study of Judi-
cial Selection in New York City 1977-2002, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791, 808-
10 (2004); CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, SUMMARY OF
DISCIPLINE STATISTICS 1990-1999 (source on file with author); Merit Selection
and Retention, "Board Information Paper," http://www.floridabar.org (follow
"Media Resources" hyperlink; then follow "Issue Papers" hyperlink; then follow
"Merit Selection and Retention" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 8, 2008).
190. See Zeidman, supra note 189, at 808-10 (comparing criminal courts
and family courts to civil courts). It is not clear from the cursory findings of the
two other studies if they compared different courts to one another as well.
191. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 539. In addition to examining
studies on merit systems, Ms. Reddick also examined two studies on non-merit
"appointive systems." Id. at 539-40. It is hard to understand why these studies
are more relevant to a study of merit systems than are the studies on merit sys-
tems themselves. One of the two studies was limited to interim appointments in
states that normally elect their judges. See Lisa M. Holmes & Jolly A. Emrey,
2008
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that the Tennessee Plan has brought greater diversity to the bench.
She suggested this by favorably comparing the number of women
and racial minorities who have been appointed under the
Tennessee Plan with "the composition of Tennessee's benches be-
fore merit selection. 192 However, comparing the race and gender
composition of the judiciary in the 1980s to the composition in the
twenty-first century is fraught with empirical peril because many
things have changed in the meantime besides the method of judi-
cial selection. For a whole host of social and legal reasons, women
and racial minorities are much more likely to be elected today than
they were two or three decades ago.' 93 Indeed, the number of black
officials elected in Tennessee increased nearly five times from
1970 to 2000.194 Ms. Reddick did not attempt to control for any of
these changes. Thus, it may very well be the case that Tennessee
would have the same number-or even more-judges who are
women and minorities today had it continued with contested elec-
tions and never adopted merit selection. On this point, it is worth
noting that Tennessee's trial judges are still subject to contested
elections, and over the last ten years, there has been little to no dif-
Court Diversification: Staffing the State Courts of Last Resort through Interim
Appointments, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 1 (2006) ("In this study, we examine a gover-
nor's ability to appoint interim replacement judges to courts of last resort in
states with elective judiciaries."). The other combined interim appointments in
states that elect their judges with appointments in merit systems. See Kathleen
A. Bratton & Rorie L. Spill, Existing Diversity and Judicial Selection: The Role
of the Appointment Method in Establishing Gender Diversity in State Supreme
Courts, 83 SOC. SCI. Q. 504, 509 n.7 (2002) ("We measure appointment as actual
appointment by governor and/or judicial nominating commission, rather than as
selection in a state with an appointment system. That is, justices who are ap-
pointed as replacement justices in election systems are considered appointed
justices."). It is therefore difficult to draw any conclusions about merit systems
in particular from these studies. In addition, the first study did not even attempt
to assess whether the differences it observed were statistically significant, and
although the second study did so, it found a statistically significant association
only for gender and only when the court was previously all-male; when the court
was not previously all-male, appointments did not improve diversity any more
than elections. See id. at 514 ("Women have a relatively high probability of
being selected to state high courts only when the court is all male.").
192. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 540.
193. See, e.g., JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES,
BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALS: A STATISTICAL SUMMARY 28 (2000).
194. See id.
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ference between the diversity of these judges and the diversity of
appellate judges who have been subject to the Tennessee Plan. 95
Even this comparison, however, is imperfect because the labor
pools for trial and appellate judges might not be the same, and as
Ms. Reddick noted,'9D some trial judges in Tennessee initially ob-
tained their positions through interim appointments from nominat-
ing commissions rather than by election.' 97 Nonetheless, all of this
is consistent with the notion that there is no good evidence one
way or another on whether merit systems like the Tennessee Plan
produce more racial or gender diversity.
C. Do Merit Systems Minimize Political Considerations in
Judicial Selection?
Ms. Reddick acknowledged that "it is impossible to entirely
eliminate politics" from judicial selection, but she argued that
merit selection is preferable to elections because it "minimize[s]
the role of politics in judicial selection."'98 She said this is the case
because judges in merit-selection states "are not required to raise
money, seek party support, or campaign for office."' 99 But even if
merit selection freed judges from these activities-and how far it
does so is not clear2°--it does not necessarily follow that merit
selection reduces the role of politics in judicial selection. Under
195. In 2007, appellate judges in Tennessee were more diverse in both
race and gender than were trial judges. See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY,
DIVERSITY OF THE BENCH, available at http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial
_selection/benchdiversity/index.cfm?state= (providing data on race and gender
of judges for each state). The opposite was true in both 2004 and 2001. See
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL DATABASE ON JUDICIAL DIVERSITY IN
STATE COURTS, available at http://www.abanet.org/judind/diversity/tennessee
.html (reporting data for 2004 on racial diversity only); AMERICAN JUDICATURE
SOCIETY, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES, available at
http://www.ajs.org/JSremoved3.3.08/js/TN-diversity.htm (citing AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, THE DIRECTORY OF MINORITY JUDGES OF THE UNITED
STATES (3d ed. 2001) (reporting data for race and gender in 2001)).
196. See White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 537 & n.238.
197. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-118(a) (1994).
198. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 541.
199. Id.
200. Judges in Tennessee, even those selected under the Tennessee Plan,
are permitted to "attend" and "speak" to "political gatherings," as well as to
"contribute to a political organization or a political candidate." See TENN. SuP.
CT. R. 10, Canon 5C(1)(a)(i), (iii), 5C(1)(b)(i).
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the Tennessee Plan, judges must be nominated by a commission of
individuals made up largely of members of special lawyers' or-
ganizations."' Nothing prevents these lawyers from considering
the ideological or jurisprudential leanings of judicial candidates,
regardless of whether the candidates raise money, seek party sup-
port, or campaign. Indeed, given that the livelihoods of these law-
yers will often depend on the jurisprudential inclinations of the
judges they nominate, it would be nothing short of superhuman if
these considerations did not enter into their deliberations. Scholars
who have studied merit-selection systems in other states have
found that such lawyers are not, in fact, superhuman. 0
That is, it may be that the Tennessee Plan does not so much
reduce the role of politics in judicial selection as it reduces the visi-
ble manifestation of politics in judicial selection (i.e., the raising
money, seeking party support, and campaigning to which Ms.
Reddick pointed). Although the Tennessee Plan's judicial nomi-
nating commission meets in public to hear testimony in favor or
against applicants for judicial office, the commission retreats be-
hind closed doors to deliberate and make its decision.203 Simply
201. Fourteen of the seventeen members of the nominating commission
must be lawyers, and twelve of the fourteen must come from names supplied by
five special lawyers' organizations: the Tennessee Bar Association, the Tennes-
see Defense Lawyers Association, the Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association, the
Tennessee District Attorneys General Conference, and the Tennessee Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102(a)(1)-(6)
(Supp. 2007).
202. See, e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, Law is the Mere Continuation of Poli-
tics by Different Means: American Judicial Selection in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 423, 466 (2007) (concluding that merit selection "is
not nonpolitical" but "simply differently political" because "[t]he politics come
into play in determining who actually gets appointed to the commission ... and
in how the commission chooses to weigh various criteria in making both initial
nominations and in doing the periodic evaluations"); G. Alan Tarr, Designing an
Appointive System: The Key Issues, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 291, 300 (2007)
("The classic study of the first 'merit selection' system in Missouri concluded
that appointment transformed the politics of judicial selection but did not elimi-
nate politics. More recent accounts have documented either partisan conflict or
competition between elements of the bar (e.g., plaintiffs' attorneys vs. defense
attorneys) in several 'merit selection' systems.").
203. See C. Barry Ward, Judicial Selection Process Serves People Well,
COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), July 1, 2007, at V3. The non-public nature of
the Tennessee Plan has been criticized by the current Governor of Tennessee,
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because the politics are not as visible, however, does not mean
they are not there. As one of the earliest studies of the Tennessee
Plan concluded, although "[i]t is doubtless true that there has been
an amelioration of the more visible manifestations of partisanship
since the establishment of the [Tennessee Plan]," the "process of
appellate court selection, whether before or after 1971, can hardly
be characterized as non-political."2°'
Indeed, I am not even sure it is possible to reduce the role
that politics plays in judicial selection. Judges (especially appel-
late judges) have a great deal of discretion to make public policy
when they decide cases.0 5 As the U.S. Supreme Court noted a few
years ago on this point, "Not only do state-court judges possess the
power to 'make' common law, but they have the immense power
to shape the States' constitutions as well." 2°6 It seems inevitable
that those who have a stake in these policy decisions will try to
influence how the judges that make them are selected. This, it
should be noted, is precisely why lawyers' organizations favor
merit-selection systems. As one scholar has pointed out, "The
merit plan gives bar associations a degree of influence in the
choice of judicial candidate unmatched under any other selection
procedure .... Lawyers support it, accordingly." 2°7
In my view, the futile effort to reduce the role that politics
plays in judicial selection obfuscates the more relevant question:
whose politics should drive the selection process and, thereby, the
public policy that the selected judges ultimately fashion. This, it
should be noted, is not an empirical question but a philosophical
one. Those who believe that public policy should be promulgated
by well-educated elites, such as the members of lawyers' organiza-
Phil Bredesen. See John Rodgers, Briley: Judicial Meetings Should Remain
Secret, CITY PAPER, Apr. 18, 2008, http://www.nashvillecitypaper.com/news.
php?viewStory=59655.
204. Robert Keele, The Politics of Appellate Court Selection in Tennessee:
1961-1981, in THE VOLUNTEER STATE: READINGS IN TENNESSEE POLITICS 231,
252 (Olshfski & Simson eds., 1985).
205. This has been well understood since the Legal Realist movement
almost one hundred years ago. See CHERMERINSKY, supra note 59, at ix-x
("[T]he legal realists long ago taught that judges have inherent discretion in
deciding cases, especially in interpreting an open-textured document such as the
Constitution.").
206. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002).
207. Hanssen, supra note 6, at 87.
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tions, should favor selection systems like the Tennessee Plan.
Those, by contrast, who believe in a more democratic form of gov-
ernment, where members of the public have the most influence
over public policy, might wish to look elsewhere.
It should be noted, again, that the Tennessee Constitution is
not silent on this philosophical question. The constitution was
amended in 1853 for the very reason of giving the public greater
control over the policymaking of the judicial branch.208 As the U.S.
Supreme Court recently put it, "[This] is precisely why the election
of state judges became popular. '21
D. Do Merit Systems Enhance Public Confidence in the Courts?
Ms. Reddick closed her portion of the response by arguing
that "substantial majorities of voters nationwide and in individual
states support merit selection and retention systems. '' 2'0 However,
the survey questions on which Ms. Reddick relied for this point
merely asked voters whether they approved or disapproved of
merit selection; they did not ask voters whether they preferred
211
merit selection over popular election. When voters are asked the
208. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 477-78 & n.33.
209. White, 536 U.S. at 784.
210. White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 543.
211. See JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN
VOTERS 12 (2001), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/JASNational
SurveyResults.pdf ("Q.80 Now, I'm going to read you a summary of a proposal
that deals with the way judges are selected. Under this proposal, a non-partisan
panel of citizens, legal professionals, and civic leaders evaluates and recom-
mends potential judges to the governor. The governor then chooses a nominee
from the list who must then be confirmed by the state legislature. After each
term, the public then votes on whether a judge should keep the seat or be re-
moved from office. If a judge is rejected, the selection process starts again.
Based on this statement, would you support or oppose such a proposal?");
Memorandum from Patrick Lanne, Public Opinion Strategies, to Interested Par-
ties 7 (Dec. 11, 2007), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/Missouri
MemoAndOverallResults.pdf ("Q.16 Now, I have a few questions about how
some [of] Missouri's judges are selected. First, under the current system, a non-
partisan panel of citizens and attorneys selected by the Governor, the state bar
association, and the Supreme Court evaluate and recommend potential judges to
the governor. The governor then chooses a new judge from the recommended
list. After a short initial term, the public then votes on whether the judge should
keep the seat or be removed from office. If a judge is rejected by the voters, the
selection process starts again. Based on this statement, do you support or op-
pose the existing system?"); JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, 2008 MINNESOTA
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latter question, the results are much different. In a recent national
poll, voters preferred elections to merit selection for state supreme
court judges by a margin of seventy-five percent to twenty-one
percent.2 2  The same is true in Tennessee, where a recent poll
showed voters in favor of elections over merit selection by a mar-
gin of over three to one.213 In any event, if merit selection is as
popular with members of the public as Ms. Reddick suggested,
then she, too, should have no problem joining with me in a call for
another vote on a constitutional amendment that would settle this
matter once and for all.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Tennessee Plan is currently set to expire on June 30,
2009.214 As I noted in my original essay, if the legislature does not
reauthorize the Plan or enact an alternative system for judicial se-
lection before then, Tennessee will most likely return by default to
contested elections to select its judges.2 5
At the close of her response, Justice White predicted that, if
the legislature fails to reauthorize the Tennessee Plan next year, it
will not be because the legislature gave consideration to arguments
or logic but instead because the legislature "gambled away" the
Plan as a "bargaining chip., 216 Justice White said much the same
PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON JUDICIAL SELECTIONS (Jan. 2008), available at
http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/MinnesotaJusticeatStakesurvey.pdf ("59.
Shall the Minnesota Constitution be amended to provide that judges shall be
appointed by the Governor from a list of names provided by a Merit Selection
Committee, evaluated based on performance, and retained or removed according
to the decision of the voters[?]").
212. See AMERICAN JUSTICE PARTNERSHIP FOUNDATION, VOTER OPINION
ON THE ELECTION OR APPOINTMENT OF STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 1 (July
2008), available at http://www.legalreforminthenews.com/2008PDFS/State
_SupremeCourtElected-vs._Appointed_7-8-08.pdf.
213. See Letter from Kellyanne Conway, President and CEO, The Polling
Company, Inc., to interested Parties (Feb. 27, 2008), available at
http://www.pollingcompany.com/cms/files/Tennessee%20Statewide%20Survey
%20January%202008.pdf (noting that 54% of voters favored returning to direct
elections and only 16% favored retaining the Tennessee Plan).
214. See TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-29-112, -229(a)(46)-(47) (2008).
215. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 1, at 485-86.
216. At the close of her response, Justice White stated that:
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thing about the decision of the people of Tennessee to adopt judi-
cial elections in 1853 (which she called "not... principled"217) and
the decision of the legislature to partially repeal the Tennessee Plan
(which she called "politics at its worst" 18).
I am more optimistic. I have the greatest regard for all
Tennessee's public servants-whether they are judges, legislators,
or others 19-and I believe that reasonable people of good faith can
disagree with one another about almost anything, including ques-
tions of constitutional law and judicial selection. I am confident
that the next legislature will have no trouble making a thoughtful
decision regarding the Tennessee Plan.
My own recommendation to the legislature is to allow the
Tennessee Plan to expire and return judicial selection to elections
until the people of Tennessee have been given another opportunity
to amend the constitution. Although judicial elections are not per-
fect, there is at least no doubt that they are constitutional.
If the Tennessee legislature fails to revive the Tennessee Plan
during the next calendar year, the Plan's demise will not be at-
tributable to either author's rhetoric or logic, nor will it signify
a considered rejection of merit selection. Rather, as has been
true from the beginning, Tennessee's merit selection system
will be yet another bargaining chip gambled away at the tables
of the Tennessee General Assembly.
White & Reddick, supra note 7, at 543.
217. Id. at 510 ("[T]he 1853 amendment was not the result of a principled
choice .... ").
218. Id.
219. I therefore do not accept Justice White's invitations to join her in
casting aspersions on these public servants. At one point she said that I "as-
sert[ed]" in my original essay that Tennessee's special judges-those temporar-
ily appointed to replace regular judges who recused themselves-are "not quali-
fied to render a decision on a matter of constitutional importance." Id. at 514
n.99. Readers will search my original essay in vain for any such assertion.
Likewise I never "implie[d]" that some of Tennessee's judges "did not deserve
either a positive evaluation or retention." Id. at 520 n. 142. Even if the Tennes-
see Plan produces outstanding judges, it does not necessarily follow that it is
consistent with the Tennessee Constitution.
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